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This thesis examines the efforts of the Republic of Bulgaria, in the period 1944-2001, 
towards democratization taking into account the broader scholarly body of research on 
democratization and its consolidation. This work analyses the impact of the socialist past (1944-
1989) and the very close relations between the state and the party in the social and political life 
of the country after the events of 1989. The way Bulgaria was run for forty-five years, its 
economy, domestic and foreign policy are the best clue to understand some of the peculiarities 
of the Bulgarian transition to democracy in the last decade. 
This thesis also examines in detail the reasons and agents of change in the country. It 
explains how the transition was accomplished and describes the reshuffling that took place. The 
thesis focuses on the changes in political and social life after 1989. It further describes and 
analyses the achievements of the leaders who came into power in 1997. 
The thesis also identifies the evolution of civil – military relations in the country as an 
important element of the democratization process. 
Since 1989 the Republic of Bulgaria, in South Eastern Europe has emerged from a 
Soviet-dominated communist system and struggles to cast off the legacy of the past until seeking 
to consolidate its democratic institutions, to launch economic reforms, and to promote its 
reintegration into Europe 
The changes in political life, society and foreign policy brought on by the process of 
democratization were unthinkable eleven years ago. The country managed to overcome many 
 x 
 
difficulties and steadily makes progress. Today Bulgaria is a zone of stability in a region of 
turmoil, sadly famous as the "powder keg" of the Balkans. 
What matters are the steps the country’s leaders will undertake to achieve the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the efforts of the Republic of Bulgaria, in the period 1944-
2001, towards democratization taking into account the broader scholarly body of research 
on democratization and its consolidation. This work describes the impact of the socialist past 
(1944-1989) and the very close relations between the state and the party on the social and 
political life of the country after the events of 1989. The way Bulgaria was run for forty-five 
years, its economy, domestic and foreign policy are the best clues to understand some of the 
peculiarities of the Bulgarian transition to democracy in the last decade. 
This thesis also examines in detail the reasons and agents of the change in the 
country. It explains how the transition was done and describes the wide range of reshuffling 
that took place. The thesis focuses on the changes in the political and social life after 1989. 
It further describes and analyses the achievements of the leadership, which came into power 
in 1997. 
A. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides the general framework of transition to and consolidation of 
democracy. Chapter III deals with the history of Bulgaria under communism. It further 
examines the key factors, elements and players on the domestic and international communist 
scene. Chapter IV describes the Bulgarian opposition and peculiarities of transition. Chapter 
V examines the political and social changes from 1995 until now. Chapter VI summarizes 





Since 1989 the Republic of Bulgaria, in South Eastern Europe has emerged from a 
Soviet-dominated communist system and struggles to cast off the legacy of the past by 
consolidating its democratic institutions, launching economic reforms, and promoting its 
reintegration into Europe.1 
For forty-five years Bulgaria lived under communist leadership established by Soviet 
and Bulgarian communists on September 9, 1944. During the long period until 1989 one 
and the same person – Todor Zhivkov, who simultaneously held the position of President 
and First Secretary of the Communist Party (the sole Party in the state) ruled the country. 
There was a strong political and economic linkeage between Bulgaria, the Former Soviet 
Union, other members of the Former Warsaw Pact, and the so-called Union of Economic 
Cooperation.  
The unrest within the Bulgarian Communist Party after 1989 resulted in a 
tremendous change in the country's leadership and orientation. In the case of Bulgaria the 
transition started on November 10, 1989 with a palace coup within the Communist Party. 
This coup was the result of the efforts of the "young" generation of communists to overthrow 
the "old" generation as represented by Todor Zhivkov. The change was not only a matter of 
personalities; it was mainly a matter of ideas and orientation. Todor Zhivkov himself (like 
                                                             
1J.Kim &C.Ek, 92064: Romania, Bulgaria, Albania: Recent Developments . Available [Online]:< 
http://www.92064 Romania, Bulgaria, Albania Recent Developments.htm.[15 January 2001] 
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Erik Honecker the leader of the GDR) was very much against the "perestroika" and the 
concepts intertwined in it. Besides he was not in a very good personal relationship with 
Soviet Premier Michail Gorbachev. The "new” generation with the "blessings" of the Soviet 
leadership started the process, which evolved into Bulgarian democratization. Bulgaria 
concentrated on a peaceful democratic building process in contrast to the events in 
Romania, where efforts focused on ending the Ceausescu regime through violence and 
bloodshed. In fact in the case of Bulgaria it was reform from above or as Linz and Stepan 
put it " A regime controlled transition to democracy."2 
Another peculiarity of the Bulgarian pattern is the role of the opposition groups. 
Unlike Czechoslovakia or Hungary in the 1980s the Bulgarian opposition developed very 
late. It emerged in mid - 1989 and was mainly comprised of educated middle class - 
university professors, artists, scholars, and environmentalists. 
The changes in political life, society and foreign policy brought on by this process of 
democratization were unthinkable eleven years ago. The country managed to overcome a 
great deal of difficulties and steadily make progress. Nowadays Bulgaria is a zone of stability 
in a region of turmoil, sadly famous as the "powder keg" of the Balkans. The country 
managed to bring together at the negotiation table and within the South East European 
Brigade, Greece and Turkey, two NATO member countries from the region, famous for 
their long lasting disputes.3 
                                                             
2Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan , Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation  (The John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996), p.338. 
3Standard Daily.(October 1997). Available [Online]:< http://www.standart.com. [01 February 2001] 
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Yet another Bulgarian achievement is its relations with NATO and the quest for 
membership in the Alliance. Throughout the eleven years of democratization the national 
very early stage, though, the words were not backed up by action. The UDF Government, 
which came into power in 1997, was the first one to undertake serious steps to this end. 
During the 1998-1999 Kosovo crisis Bulgaria time and again proved that it is not only a 
reliable partner but would also make a credible member. For example Bulgaria provided 
access to its airspace for the Alliance airplanes. 
In December 1999 Bulgaria was invited to start the accession negotiations with the 
EU. In November 2000 the country was taken off of the “black” Shengen list requiring visas 
for the citizens of all non-EU countries when travelling to EU member states. 
The country’s leaders must now concentrate on the steps required to achieve 
consolidation of democracy and return the country back to the bigger European family 
where it belongs. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis relies on an analytical survey of primary and secondary sources related to 
the domestic and foreign policy processes that resulted in Bulgaria’s transition to 
democracy.4 This study comprises a case study of Bulgaria, which provides background 
about the problems the countries from Central and Eastern Europe have faced while taking 
into account the major parameters of the process of establishing and consolidating 
                                                             
4The thesis will rely on a number of studies done by American scholars, research done by Bulgarian 
authors as well as unclassified government documents. 
 5 
 
democracy. This thesis describes the difficult road Bulgaria has taken seen through the eyes 
of distinguished European scholars as well as Bulgarian and US experts. 
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II.  TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY  
Bulgaria is not yet a consolidated democracy and much has to be done to achieve 
this goal. A road map of what has to be achieved in the future can be provided by Larry 
Diamond’s “Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation” and Juan J. Linz & Alfred 
Stepan’s “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.” 
The world’s trend towards democratization started to gain momentum after 1974 
when the Portuguese military overthrew the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship5 and when in 1975 
the Helsinki Act was signed, which laid the basis of the democratization at large. Beginning 
in Southern Europe in the mid 1970s, spreading through South America, East, Southeast 
and South Asia at the end of the 1980s the democratization wave reached the communist 
countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as Central America. 
According to the Stanford scholar Larry Dimond “Democratization is generally a 
good thing and democracy is the best form of government.”6 Dwelling upon the positive 
characteristics of democracy Diamond points out that governments chosen in a democratic 
way i.e. through free and fair elections are much better than those that are not. Historically 
democracy provides, by definition, better protection of human rights as compared to most 
totalitarian regimes. In depicting one of the most important characteristics of democracy 
Diamond refers to Bruce Russet, who "notes that democracies ‘rarely fight each other even 
at low levels of lethal violence” and they are much less likely to let their disputes with one 
                                                             





another escalate.”7 Such institutionalized democracies settle their domestic issues peacefully 
as well. To the most viable dimensions of democracy as the best form of government, such 
as protection of rights to protest and organize, free flow of information, wider deliberation, 
debate, transparency in policy making, greater respect for law, good mechanisms to hold 
rulers accountable, the better protection of environment and steady progress in human well-
being can also be are added.  
Since establishing democracy is not enough quite logically comes the issue of 
democracy consolidation. 
Consolidation requires more than a commitment to democracy in the 
abstract, that democracy is ‘in principle’ the best form of government. For a 
democracy to be consolidated, elites, organizations, and the mass public 
must all believe that the political system they actually have in their country is 
worth obeying and defending. This robust legitimacy involves a shared 
normative and behavioral commitment to the specific rules and practices of 
the country’s constitutional system, what Juan Linz calls ‘loyalty’ to the 
democratic regime.8 
 
Thus the indication of consolidation has three levels: elite, organizations, and mass 
public with two dimensions each – norms and beliefs and behavior.  
To achieve consolidation all new and fragile democracies have to perform three 
tasks “democratic deepening, political institutionalization, and regime performance.”9 
According to Larry Diamond the consolidation of democracy also is closely related 
to the political culture in a given country. He refers to five major ways through which the 
political culture can contribute to the consolidation of democracy. 
                                                             
7 Ibid., p.5. 




One of the ways is the support for democracy-legitimacy. Legitimacy does not 
depend on income, education or age. It is based on the belief that democracy works well in 
the respective country. The other reasons for the legitimacy are the little nostalgia for the 
authoritarian past and the results of a good working democracy as seen in the country. 
”Democratic consolidation is most evident and secure when support for democracy is not 
only unconditional but also widely shared by all major political groups and tendencies.”10 
A very useful tool in democracy strengthening is explaining the support for it. The 
reasons for the public support for democracy are to be found in the way the system deals 
with the economic and social problems, the degree to which it fulfills its promise of freedom 
and democracy, the social structure of society and one of its most important features – 
education and youth.  
The third factor is evaluating democracy: the role of system performance. This 
dimension of the consolidation is mainly tied to the economic conditions, which shape the 
satisfaction with democracy.  “Satisfaction with democracy is strongly influenced by 
personal economic assessments; the greater the economic optimism, the greater the 
satisfaction with the way democracy is working.”11 
The fourth important factor is the trust in democracy and more particularly 
confidence in institutions.”The ideal democratic culture is neither blindly trusting nor hostilely 





rejecting but it is inquisitive and skeptical. What a healthy democracy must avoid is cynicism, 
a sweeping distrust of political and social institutions.”12  
The last factor is internal and external efficacy. 
When citizens are knowledgeable, informed and participant; when they are 
confident that their engagement can have some impact on political outcomes 
(internal efficacy); and when they believe the political system is responsive to 
their concerns (external efficacy) we should expect high level of support for 
and satisfaction with democracy.13 
 
Diamond relates the consolidation of democracy to the civil society. The author 
argues that there are five important features of a democratic civil society: how it governs its 
own internal affairs; what are the goals and methods of groups in civil society; the level of 
organizational institutionalization; pluralism and last but not least density. 
Civil society advances democracy by helping it to accomplish the transition from the 
authoritarian rule to electoral democracy as well as by deepening and consolidating it after 
democracy is established.14 
By contrast civil society has a wide range of functions and mechanisms to promote 
democratic development and consolidation. The most important function is to provide ”the 
basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and 
hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that 
control.”15 Among the other mechanisms are: supplementing the role of the political parties 
through stimulating the political participation and increasing the political efficacy of the 







citizens; via education for democracy; by structuring multiple channels other than the political 
parties in order to articulate and represent the interests; via  effecting the “transition from 
clientelism to citizenship” at the local level; by generating a wide range of interests that might 
cross-cut and in this way mitigate the principal polarities of the political conflict; through 
recruiting and training new political leaders; through civic organizations and foundations; by 
information dissemination and lots of others. 
Although Linz and Stepan formulate in a slightly different manner the basic 
characteristics of democratization, they are in major agreement with Diamond concerning the 
characteristics of democratization. Linz and Stepan talk about completed democratic 
transition, which they define as : 
A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been 
reached about the political procedures to produce an elected government, 
when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and 
popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate 
new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power 
generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other 
bodies de jure.16 
 
The transition to democracy, though, is only part of the very complicated 
democratization process. The next very important step in establishing an enduring 
democracy is its consolidation or as the authors put it when “democracy has become the 
‘only game in town.”17 Two critical aspects arise as for the completed democratic transition. 
First some transitions may begin but are never completed in spite of the fact that a new 
authoritarian regime does not come into power. Of outmost importance for a transition to 
                                                             
16Juan.Linz &Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation  (The John 




democracy is an agreement on the institutional arrangements for a democratic government. 
The lack of such an agreement might not only leave the transition incomplete but would also 
postpone the consolidation of democracy.  
Consolidated democracy has three dimensions: behavioral “when no significant 
political groups try to overthrow the democratic regime, or secede from the state”18; 
attitudinal- in spite of all political and economic crises the great majority of the population 
believe in the democratic formulas; and constitutional-all the conflicts are resolved by laws 
and procedures developed in the new democratic spirit. 
Linz and Stepan also believe that consolidated democracies need to have five 
interacting and mutually reinforcing arenas, namely: civil society, political society, rule of law, 
state apparatus and economic society.19 
In essence the transition to democracy and its consolidation is a movement from a 
non-democratic to a democratic regime. Differences can exist among the polities in the paths 
they can take for the transition as well as the tasks they have to finish before consolidating 
the democracy. Although Linz and Stepan agree with the other analysts on the classification 
of the political system into democracy, authoritarianism and totalitarianism, they come up 
with a revised, much more contemporary typology comprising of: democratic, authoritarian, 
totalitarian and sultanistic regimes. The authors argue that since the Soviet-type systems in 
the 1980s, when considered how they deal and meet certain criteria like “institutional 
pluralism” for example, were not totalitarian, a regime type called post-totalitarian should be 
included to the types of regimes. A very important characteristic of post-totalitarianism is “an 




important ideological legacy that can not be ignored.”20 Post-totalitarianism in its turn 
encompasses a continuum from “early-post-totalitarianism” to “frozen post-totalitarianism” 
to “mature post-totalitarianism.”21 It is characterized by a limited but not responsible social, 
economic and institutional pluralism, lack of political pluralism, the leadership is seldom 
charismatic and the personal security is heavily emphasized. 
Apart from the “macrovariables” of previous regime type and stateness, democratic 
transition and consolidation are affected by some other important variables. There are five 
such variables. Two of them are actor-centered:and address the leadership of the previous 
non-democratic regime and the initiator of the transition. The other three are context 
oriented: international influences, political economy of legitimacy and coercion and 
constitution making environment. As for the leadership of the previous non-democratic 
regime four different categories of elites can be distinguished: hierarchical military; non-
hierarchical military; a civilian elite and the distinctive category of sultanistic elites. 
Linz and Stepan mention the following patterns in the ways to initiate a transition: an 
uprising of civil society; sudden collapse of the non-democratic regime; armed revolution or 
a non-hierarchically led military coup.22 They end with an interim or provisional government, 
which rules the country. There is yet another type of transitions: initiated by hierarchical 
state-led or regime led forces. They do not result in interim governments. A perfect example 







of which is Bulgaria where a change of the regime from the above was done with no interim 
government and no elections set.  
In their work the two scholars also describe the context variables, which according 
to them divide the international influence into foreign policies, zeitgeist and diffusion. The 
three ways in which foreign policies influence democratization and consolidation are: gate 
opening to democratic efforts an example of which is what happened in the Soviet block in 
Eastern Europe in 1989, subversion and helping a fledging democracy in the region to 
complete the democratic transition and consolidate it. Basically the authors do not believe in 
zeitgeist (spirit of times) but they do believe that democratically supportive zeitgeist 
substantially increases the chances of a country to choose democratization. The diffusion 
effect is very similar to the domino effect with a positive connotatio n only. In the presence of 
a tight group of countries the positive developments in one of them will spill over the others 
and instigate them. A good example of which are again the developments in the former 
Eastern Block. 
 Based on the theoretical background provided by Diamond and Linz and Stepan, 
Bulgaria is an important case study of the process of transition to democracy and the steps 
in democratic consolidation.  
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III.  BULGARIA UNDER COMMUNISM 
A. BULGARIA FROM 1944 UNTIL THE 1980S 
There are several important dates in the history of Bulgaria. Some of them are still 
respected and cherished by the nation, others were a source of pride years ago but not any 
more. 
March 3,1878 marks an important event in Bulgaria’s history. On this date as a 
result of the San Stefano Treaty, Bulgaria was liberated from the five century Turkish yoke 
and came into being as an autonomous country.  
The period 1878 – 1912 was one of prosperity and progress for Bulgaria. But the 
country’s participation in the two Balkan wars and the two World Wars resulted in defeat 
for Bulgaria and shattered and weak economy.  
Another important date, though of doubtful value nowadays, is September 9, 1944. 
It marks the establishment of a new political order in which the communists gradually 
assumed dominance. The best key to understanding 1944 is the country’s position in WWII. 
As James F. Brown, Senior Fellow at the Research Institute of Communist Affairs 
at Columbia University, puts it in his book Bulgaria Under Communist Rule  the country 
had a very “peculiar” position during World War II.23 Bulgaria sided with the Germans and 
declared war on Britain and the United States but not on the USSR. Regretfully this position 
did not manage to protect the country from the Russian invasion once the fortunes of the 
USSR and Germany reversed. In September 1944 after the Red Army had invaded 
                                                             
23James.F. Brown ,Bulgaria Under Communist Rule ( Praeger  Publishers, 1970), p.3.  
 15 
 
Rumania, Russia declared war on Bulgaria. At that time a three-man Regency Council ruled 
the country. The position of the then ruling body went through serious ups and downs: 
Initially very anti-Soviet, the position of this council changed considerably 
when Muraviev replaced Filov as its head at the beginning of September 
1944; Bulgaria now denounced the Germans and attempted to negotiate an 
armistice with the Western Allies. But this did not placate the Soviets, who 
entered Bulgaria on 8 September; in such a situation, there was little point in 
the Muraviev government attempting to resist the Soviet-backed Fatherland 
Front when it made a bid for power on 9 September, and the coup 
succeeded with a minimum of fuss.24 
 
The Fatherland Front that was installed on September 9 was a coalition of various 
anti-fascist parties with two dominating fractions: the communists and the left wing of the 
Agrarians. Though the communists were second only to the Agrarians account should be 
taken of the fact that up to September 1944 the communist membership never exceeded 
30,000.25 
In September 1944 the communists started to establish themselves as the only 
power in the country. They took over Interior and Justice Ministries through which were 
able to suppress any opposition by the power of the State. Very soon all the opposition 
elements were imprisoned and some of them even executed. Thus terror became 
instrumental in governing the country, which regretfully was not something new to Bulgaria. 
Relying on terror the communists were rearranging the local government to their own 
advantage and subordinating all the structures to the Party.  
Apart from trying to suffocate any kind of opposition the communists turned against 
their coalition partners in the Fatherland Front and mainly the Agrarians. In 1945 as a result 
                                                             
24Bogdan Szajkowski,  Marxist Governments. A World Survey, Volume 1 (The Macmillan Press LTD, 
London and Basingstoke, 1981), p.119. 
25James.F. Brown ,Bulgaria Under Communist Rule ( Praeger Publishers, 1970), p.5. 
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of the pressure of both domestic and the Soviet communists, the Agrarians were forced to 
replace their old leader G.M. Dimitrov with Nikola Petkov. The communists were showing 
their determination to be surrounded only by like-minded people. Unfortunately Nikola 
Petkov did not prove to be a good choice, since he was as hostile to communism as his 
predecessor was. Nonetheless the communists were achieving their goals. The first serious 
blow to the opposition to the communists was done in 1947 when the influence of the 
Western Allies in Bulgaria was weakened and more so after the signature of the Paris Peace 
Treaty. Right after the ratification of the Treaty by the US Senate, Petkov was arrested and 
executed and “his death symbolized the end of tolerated opposition in Bulgaria”26 
The culmination of the consolidation of communism came in 1948, when the 
Fatherland Front at its Second Congress took a decision to build a socialist Bulgaria. Within 
a very short period of time all the opposition parties were disbanded and those which were 
loyal to the Communist party merged with it and committed themselves to socialism.27 
The steps undertaken by the new regime were not only in the political realm. The 
party actions were backed up by efforts in the economic field. In the period 1944-1947 the 
biggest nationalization was done. The industry and banks were under full state ownership. 
Because of a law passed in 1946, specifying how much land a family could own, vast areas 
were confiscated from some of the wealthy families and the church. At the same time the 
people were forced to join the co-operative farming system. 
                                                             
26Bogdan Szajkowski,  Marxist Governments. A World Survey, Volume 1 (The Macmillan Press LTD, 




In 1948 at its Fifth Congress the Bulgarian Communist Party decided that Bulgaria 
would construct full-scale socialism. In the context of the time socialism was mainly related 
to production relations. To that end the first Five-year Plan was adopted. It covered the 
period 1949-53 but according to the reports coming from industry it was accomplished 
even a year earlier. The plan was mainly focusing on a change in the orientation of the 
industry-from light to heavy branches. During that period the largest amount of investments 
went for the building and developing of heavy industry. Things changed a little bit, though, in 
1953, when after Stalin’s death the reform process known as the New Course provided 
some investments for the development of other sectors like housing construction and 
agriculture. In that same period the collectivization of the land that started around 1947 was 
continued. In spite of the announced strategy of peasants voluntarily joining the collectives, 
encouraged by the advantages and material incentives, a great deal of the peasants were 
coerced to join, especially the wealthy ones. The wealthiest were called “kulaks”28 and 
imprisoned.  
1956 is a cornerstone year for the development of the Bulgarian Communist party. 
During the Plenum held in April, Vulko Chervenkov, the most ardent promoter and follower 
of Stalin’s personality cult had to resign from the post of Premier. Already in 1954 Todor 
Zhivkov as Party Secretary had replaced Chervenkov. The demotion of Chervenkov 
brought a great relief among the Party members since he was arrogant and mistrustful and 
with no personal attractiveness. On the one hand the April Plenum opened up new 
opportunities for Zhivkov, who was named by the Central Committee as head of the 




Political Bureau. Right after the Plenum the Party experienced democratization with criticism 
and self-criticism welcomed. The conservatives within the Bulgarian Communist Party did 
not like this and the regime as a whole tightened the discipline through the press and radio 
campaign as well as agitprop meetings. Bulgaria was proclaimed a socialist country where 
this regime was working. The industry was entirely nationalized and the agriculture was 
almost fully collectivized. 
The next step in the evolution of the communist regime came in 1958 when the 
“Great Leap Forward, a movement which, though economic in nature, had ramifications for 
all important aspects of Bulgarian life.”29 It was actually the essence of the approved at the 
Seventh BCP Congress in June 1958 Third Five Year Plan. The goals of the Plan as 
Zhivkov stated were not to double but to triple economic production by 1962.30 This 
resulted in a great sacrifice and hard work for the population. No matter that the original 
production targets were not reached sufficient progress in the economic field was made. The 
government did not keep its promises about increased wages and living standards since not 
much could be done within two years. Furthermore the Great Leap Forward caused certain 
unrest among the population as well as within the Party itself. But in spite of the real, 
concrete figures and achievements the government in its typical style at the end of the period 
reported that the stated goals were realized twice as much as the initial estimates. 
                                                             




The official ideology stated that Bulgaria would be transformed into an advanced 
socialist state by 1971; after that it would progress to develop mature socialism. According 
to the prognosis in 1976 the stage of mature socialism would be reached in 1990.31 
Throughout the 1970s many changes were undertaken in the economy. Some of the 
important ones are the concentration of industrial management from the individual enterprise 
to larger associations and the creation of the agro-industrial complexes. The Party was 
seriously concerned about the economy and its development and improvement. This 
concern and desire for improvement was reflected in all Five Year Plans and all Congresses 
communiques. 
Apart from the hard work in the economic field a lot of changes were taking place in 
the field of Party politics. In the beginning of the 60s Zhivkov finally managed to dispose of 
two of his most serious rivals – Chervenkov and Yugov. Chervenkov was seriously 
criticized by Zhivkov for the personality cult during the 1956 April Plenum as a result of 
which Chervenkov lost the Premiership. Yugov was charged by Zhivkov to have been 
against the Great Leap Forward. This accusation together with various crimes alleged by 
Zhivkov, deprived Yugov of the Premiership as well. Thus in 1962 Zhivkov was securing for 
himself all the important positions in the state. From 1962 to 1971 he headed the Council of 
Ministers. In 1971 Zhivkov relinquished this post in order to assume the presidency of the 
newly created State Council.  
All in all it seemed that the unrest within the Party itself had settled down. 
Furthermore Zhivkov was very good at getting rid of those threatening his position. 
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Sometimes he did not even bother to give any reasons for the demotion of some of the Party 
functionaries as it happened with Mitko Grigorov at the Ninth Congress in 1966. While in 
the case of Boris Velchev, when he lost his post of Central Committee secretaryship in 1977 
all the negatives were pointed out.32 In summary everybody who was a threat to Zhivkov or 
too ambitious was removed in due time.  
B. BULGARIA IN THE 1980S 
1. The Spirit of the Time  
Many Bulgarians in the second half of the twentieth century knew no other 
ruler (but Zhivkov). With wry Bulgarian humor, many used to say during the 
1980s that conditions in their country were getting so bad that they would 
like to go into a deep freeze for a hundred years and then thaw out and 
resume living. But, they acknowledged it would be pointless because Todor 
Zhivkov would still be in power.33 
 
Among all communist leaders in Central and Eastern Europe Zhivkov is the one who 
stayed in power for the longest time. Apart from being very skillful at “communist Tammany 
politics”34 his longevity in power was very much due to his relations and loyalty to Moscow. 
In his article  “Democratization and political participation in ‘postcommunist’ Bulgaria” 
published in ”Politics, power, and the struggle for democracy in South Eastern Europe” by 
Cambridge University Press, John D. Bell35 states that Bulgaria during the Communist era 
was a rather passive country. It was the only one among the East European states, which 
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did not go through any crisis in its relations with the Soviet Union. This was partly due to the 
excellent personal relationships between the leaders of the two countries. Zhivkov had good 
relations with Khrushchev, but his friendship and like-mindedness with Brezhnev was 
outstanding. That is why J.F. Brown argues that the peak in Zhivkov’s leadership was in the 
period 1956-1982. After Brezhnev’s death Zhivkov started to experience problems in his 
relations with Moscow. Andropov, Brezhnev’s successor was less favorably disposed to 
Zhivkov. The tension was slightly reduced when Chernenko came into power, but to 
Zhivkov’s regret Chernenko’s rule did not last long. The beginning of Gorbachev’s regime 
marked the end of Zhivkov’s.  
The changes at the top in the former USSR and the problems that Zhivkov incurred 
as a result, were not the only reason for what happened throughout the 1980s in Bulgaria. 
In that period Bulgaria, like most countries in the former Eastern block, was 
overtaken by the slow-motion crisis developing through that part of the world. This had its 
implications on the economy as well: it became less competitive compared to the Western 
and rapidly developing Southeast Asian countries. There was a serious difference between 
the economy of 1982 and 1985. In 1985 Bulgaria’s economy suffered a serious slide. The 
major victims were energy and agriculture. The capital and other towns were blacked out at 
night to ease the energy shortage. Agriculture was doing badly because of a severe winter 
and dry summer and the nation faced a serious food and consumer shortage.36 
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Furthermore the political life of the country was characterized by a total immobility 
because of the long tenure of Todor Zhivkov. The cultural policy became more restricted 
and people who earlier showed more understanding of the regime, started to loose their 
patience once they had to spend most of their time in shopping lines and desperately looking 
for consumer goods. 
The economy was just one part of the equation. Other international and domestic 
factors added to the deterioration of the system. The country’s image was seriously 
smudged by the attempt on Pope John Paul’s life in 1981. Three years after the actual 
incident the member of the Turkish terrorist organization “The Grey Wolfs” incriminated the 
Bulgarian security services and more particularly Sergei Antonov, a Bulgarian Airlines official 
in Rome as the actual perpetrators of that act. In 1986 Antonov was freed since his and 
respectively his country’s guilt could not be proven. But the whole issue smeared Bulgaria’s 
international prestige.37 
Still the country was facing serious internal problems, namely the ethnic minorities 
and more particularly the ethnic Turks. In mid 80s the regime became highly intolerant of 
minorities. While in the 1970es the Pomaks were forced to adopt a mainstream Bulgarian 
identity in 1984 the authorities under Zhivkov’s directions took yet another step by launching 
the so-called Revival Process. The regime in Sofia believed and insisted that these people 
were not Turks but Turkicized Bulgarians and saw their mission as reverting them to 
Bulgarians. The Pomacs were suppressed in their cultural activities and forced to adopt 
Bulgarian names. The unbearable pressure resulted in masses of ethnic Turks leaving the 
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country and seeking settlement in heavily populated Turkish areas.38 The situation got even 
worse in 1989 when between June and August about 315,000 Turks left Bulgaria, about 30 
% of the total.39 As a result of this mass exodus the Bulgarian economy was seriously 
harmed, but what really suffered was the reputation of the country. Although a great number 
of the Turks came back to Bulgaria because of the way they were treated in Turkey the 
damage was irreparable. 
If the regime at this point in time should be characterized, reference must be made to 
Linz and Stepan, who define the communist rule in Bulgaria as “early post-totalitarianism,”40 
characterized by “an important ideological legacy that can not be ignored and that can not 
be questioned officially.”41  
2. The Impact of Perestroika 
Throughout his leadership, Zhivkov had always stressed his fidelity to the Soviet 
Union. Thus it was inevitable for him to adopt some of Gorbachev's "new thinking", though, 
the concept did not appeal very much to Zhivkov. In 1987 Zhivkov introduced the so-called 
July Concept, which was an indication that he had entirely embraced the cause of the 
reform. Some of the main issues in the "July Concept", outlined by Zhivkov himself, were 
administrative and economic reorganization, steps towards political democratization among 
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which expansion of the press freedom and experiments with multi-candidate elections, 
massive reorganization of local government and of the central state apparatus. The July 
Concept though “ constituted, in fact, a shambling, incoherent document whose amateurish 
pretentiousness reminded suffering Bulgar-watchers of the Maoist vagaries of the Bulgarian 
‘Great Leap Forward’ of thirty years before.”42 Furthermore the July Concept seemed to 
have a much greater impact in the Soviet Union as compared to that in Bulgaria itself. In 
October 1987 Zhivkov made a one day visit to Moscow, during which he discussed with 
Gorbachev the implications of the July Concept. The Soviet leader’s position was very 
tough. During that meeting Zhivkov was warned to watch for the leading role of the party 
and to control the speed and scale of the reform.43 In spite of the preemptive strategy of the 
July Concept, Zhivkov’s undertakings were rebuked by Gorbachev. 
Even more intriguing was what Gorbachev’s sharp response might have 
indicated in terms of Soviet and his own thinking. It was obviously 
inconsistent with the Mark II hands-off policy begun about the beginning of 
1987. What prompted the Soviet leader, then, to break his own rule? His 
antipathy to Zhivkov may have had something to do with it, but- more 
important-it more likely indicated the threshold of Gorbachev’s political 
tolerance at the time.44 
 
Obviously Gorbachev had almost no political tolerance of Zhivkov’s initiatives, 
which had to be stopped. The steps Gorbachev took to this end marked the beginning of the 
end of Zhivkov’s political evolution. This further undermined the sclerotic regime in Sofia. 
Zhivkov began to loose touch with what was going on in the international scene; he was no 
longer able to understand all the processes. The official position of the Bulgarian regime was 





unconditional support for the glasnost and perestroika, but actually it was of no consistency 
whatsoever. What was supposed to be perestroika Bulgarian style was debacle Bulgarian 
style. As far as glasnost was concerned in comparison with neighboring Rumania, Bulgaria 
was far better off, but compared to the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary the Bulgarian 
pattern of glasnost was ridiculously narrow because of the limitations installed by Zhivkov. 
There were some other factors apart from the aftermath of the glasnost and 
perestroika that made Zhivkov vulnerable. He became narrow, more tyrannical and corrupt. 
His vanity was an object of grim jokes. The printer’s apprentice from Pravetz developed a 
mania for writing and publishing collected speeches, articles and theses. His works were 
published not only in the countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact but in the West as well. 
His infatuation of being published reached such dimensions that people in “Sofia comment 
that he was the only man who had ever written more books than he had read.”45 
No matter that Zhivkov was in his right mind he was beginning to lose control over 
the situation. He still made some efforts even at the beginning of 1989 to maintain his 
position but in vain. He came up with Decree 56, which was envisaged to sufficiently boost 
the economy and thus make people give the regime yet another chance. Yet another 
manifestation of the fact that he had completely lost touch with reality was his determination 
to promote his son Vladimir. Obviously he hoped that Vladimir would replace in political life 
his daughter Lyudmila, who died in 1981. While Lydmila managed to make nepotism almost 
respectable and to a certain extent improved the image of Bulgaria through its culture, 
Vladimir was very much like Nicu Ceausescu. In spite of the disgust of many communists 




and in one last attempt to prove his tyrannical character, in July 1989 Zhivkov put Vladimir 
in charge of the Central Committee’s Commission for Culture.46  
All these events plus the openness that came with the glasnost and perestroika no 
matter of how small scale it was helped the need for a change to grow and mature. 
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IV.  THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN BULGARIA 
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
For Bulgaria the notion of democratization is not a new one. The country has legacy 
of establishing a democratic society and the struggle for democracy has always been a 
constant and recurring theme but the real process of democratization began in 1989. 
Throughout the five centuries of Ottoman domination people like Vasil Levski and 
Hristo Botev worked for the awakening of the national identity of their fellow countrymen, 
who envisioned and strived to create a state that was both democratic and independent. 
“Vasil Levsky, ’The Apostle’ of national rediscovery, wrote of his hope that Bulgaria would 
become ‘ a sacred and pure republic’ and the verse of Christo Botev, the poet-laureate of 
the struggle for national independence, displayed strong sympathy toward radical social and 
political ideals.”47 
Regretfully, since its liberation from five centuries of Ottoman domination in 1878 
Bulgaria has been ruled by royal, military or Communist dictatorships, which explicitly 
rejected the democratic institutions as “anarchic” or “bourgeois.”48  
In spite of the circumstances the spirit of liberalism has always been alive in Bulgaria. 
It was implanted in the country’s lifestyle as early as the creation of the modern Bulgarian 
State back in 1879. During a convention held in the historic town of Veliko Tirnovo the 
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delegates adopted a Constitution that provided for a Bulgaria with strict limits of monarchy 
and wide spectrum of civil rights. 
In general the Balkans were not a productive soil for the Western type of 
democracy due to the lack of a middle class, economic system and low level of political 
consciousness among the rural majority. Furthermore in the case of Bulgaria the imported 
monarchs did not have any sympathy for the democratic values.  
Nevertheless in Bulgaria the democratic trend has always been present on the 
political scene either in a more open or subtle manner. Before WWI the embodiment of the 
democratic spirit were the Democratic and Radical parties, supported by the intelligentsia 
and the professional classes, and the Social Democratic party, which supported by the civil 
servants and part of the working class advocated gradual reforms in a democratic context.49 
Another important player was the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union which was Bulgaria’s 
mass democracy party aiming at attracting the peasant majority. This party managed to 
prove its stance after WWI with the lead by Alexander Stamboliiski government. 
“Stamboliiski was himself a peasant and devoted his life to the cause of the peasant’s 
political rights.”50 Stamboliiski was in power for almost four years and worked very hard to 
improve the plight of the population. Among the things he did was to carry out a Land 
Reform, attempt to reform the legal system so that justice becomes cheaper and affordable 
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for the people, and to change the tax policy so that property is distributed more fairly. In his 
endeavor to maintain the spirit of patriotism he introduced the Compulsory Labor Service.51 
Like all leaders Stamboliiski had his faults but his death and exit from the political 
scene had a highly negative impact on the process of democratization in Bulgaria. 
After his murder foreign policy fell into the hands of the chauvinists, and the 
interests of the people were subordinated to those of a small clique. The 
hope of Democracy in Bulgaria was buried.52 
 
During WWII some of the members of the democratic opposition joined their efforts 
with these of the Fatherland Front against Bulgaria’s particip ation in the war on the side of 
Germany. The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union resisted the communization efforts through 
an Opposition Bloc under Nikola Petkov. With the failure of the Opposition Bloc in the 
1946 elections and the indifference of the West to Bulgaria, the communists managed to 
take all the power and put an end to the democratic resistance to communization. 
This particular trend lasted from 1946 until 1989, since communism and Zhivkov’s 
regime managed to smother all the efforts towards democratization. It was at the end of 
1989 when the democratic spirit and will for changes in the country were revived. 
B. THE BULGARIAN OPPOSITION 
The Bulgarian organized dissident movement started to rise in the late 1980s.As Linz 
and Stepan put it in their findings:  
Our conclusion is that independently organized democratic opposition 
actively emerged as an effective force in Bulgaria only by mid 1989. Until 
                                                             




that time the Bulgarian regime in the area of pluralism approximated a 
totalitarian model53 
 
Some attributr this late rise of the dissident movement to Zhivkov’s approach, which 
was lavish to all intellectuals compliant with him. In contrast those intellectuals who did not 
agree with him were persecuted.  
Despite the government’s persecution the dissidents in Bulgaria continued the work 
they had started. People like Blaga Dimitrova and Radoi Ralin dared to depict the stupidity 
and moral backwardness of the system in written form.  
Another key figure of the Bulgarian opposition is the country’s best-known dissident 
Zhelju Zhelev. His book “Fascism,” which is a comprehensive study of totalitarianism, was 
published as early as 1981 but was immediately suspended.  
Working from a limited set of resources and without access to 
contemporary Western analyses, Zhelev arrived at a position similar to that 
reached by Hannah Arendt, Carl Friedrich, and others, that totalitarianism 
encompassed the experience of fascist and Communist states.”54 
 
Encouraged by the turn of events in the Soviet Union and other East European 
countries Zhelev together with other intellectuals created a Club for the Support of Glasnost 
and Perestroika to discuss reform proposals. On 7 December upon Zhelev’s proposal 
several members of that club formed the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF)55. The UDF 
was comprised of the Federation of Clubs for the Support of Glasnost and Democracy, the 
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Podkrepa Independent Labor Confederation, BANU-Nikola Petkov, the Social 
Democrats, the Committee for Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual 
Values, Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Bulgaria and other 
smaller groups.  
Another key organization of the Bulgarian opposition was an ecological movement 
“Ecoglasnost”, established in the town of Ruse. It openly challenged the regime’s 
indifference to the destruction of the country’s environment. The occasion, which provoked 
action by this group, was poison from chlorine gas emissions from Romania. Among the 
most outstanding promoters of that movement were politicians, sports and arts celebrities. 
Following the example of the Polish Solidarity, the physician Konstantin Trenchev 
created “Podkrepa”, which was an independent trade union challenging the monopoly of the 
party-controlled unions.  
Different groups aiming to promote political and religious rights and freedom were 
established to include the “Social Democrats” of Dr. Petar Dertliev and “BANU - Nikola 
Petkov” headed by Milan Drenchev. 
As far as the Bulgarian opposition in general is concerned: 
Many dissidents came from the ranks of the Communist Party, although in 
this respect Bulgaria was hardly an exception among former communist 
countries. It has been pointed out that Bulgaria’s small size, the 
concentration of potential dissidents in the capital, the café-society 
atmosphere and the highly personal character of relations between the few 
dissident intellectuals rendered the organization of secret clubs or an 
underground press both difficult and superfluous .”56 
 




In response to the undertakings of the mid 1980s, Zhivkov reverted to established 
methods. Those Party members, who affiliated with the dissident groups were sanctioned, 
dismissed from work and expelled from the Communist Party. In addition in February 1989 
Zhivkov met with the intelligentsia to warn them that Bulgaria would not tolerate a negative 
attitude to the country and socialism.57 But this time it was too late. The opposition did not 
retreat and Bulgarian dissidents continued with their activities. 
Furthermore, other events contributed to the decline of Zhivkov’s power. In the 
spring of the same year the regime was challenged by events in regions with a heavy Turkish 
population. Since the Revival Process in Bulgaria, the Turks had prepared an underground 
organization, which started to undertake a series of hunger strikes, demonstrations and 
clashes with the authorities. The terror directed against ethnic Turks within Bulgaria and the 
perceived lack of desire by authorities to address the real issues, resulted in the Turks 
crossing the border and finding refuge in hastily organized camps. Before the Turkish 
government could close the border, about 300,000 ethnic Turks that had left Bulgaria .58 The 
world as a whole took serious account of the unprecedented violation of human rights by the 
Bulgarian authorities. 
C. THE POST-COMMUNIST ERA 
The major events that caused and served to define the character of the post-
communist era are the events of November 10, 1989, and the Round Table Talks of 1990. 
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In Bulgaria the regime collapsed in a unique way. While these events in neighboring 
Balkan countries can be characterized as illegal, the transition in Bulgaria was within the 
framework of the law. In Yugoslavia the violations of the constitution of Serbia resulted in 
the outbreak of ethnic violence and war. Romania witnessed a managed revolution with the 
execution of ex-dictator Caucesku and his wife59 being televised.In contrast. Zhivkov’s 
withdrawal was a peaceful event.  
Different experts and analysts have different explanations of “why” and “how” 
Zhivkov stepped down. There is a great deal of second-guessing as to “who” was 
promoting this change. John D. Bell points out several reasons for Zhivkov’s 
"retirement/removal": his erratic performance, his attempt to propel his son into the 
leadership, Zhivkov's poor relationship with Gorbachev, the unraveling of communist 
regimes across Eastern Europe.60 
This unravelling of communist regimes fits within the theoretical background of 
democratization as provided by Linz and Stepan. According to them this is a context 
variable which divides the international influence into foreign policies, zeitgeist and diffusion. 
The authors dwell upon the three ways in which the foreign policy influences democratization 
and consolidation: gate opening, subversion, and helping a fledging democracy and zeitgeist. 
In the case of Bulgaria the events in Central and Eastern Europe resulted in gate opening to 
democratic efforts. Additionally using the author’s  scientific apparatus, Bulgaria was greatly 
influenced by the democratically supportive zeitgeist and the diffusion effect coming from the 
other countries.  
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Linz and Stepan do not specify the reasons, but characterize the events in Bulgaria 
as an internal party coup. This is a direct manifestation of the type of transition the authors 
formulate as initiated by hierarchical state–led or regime-led forces.61 
There is also a difference between the experts as to “who” was the instigator. For 
John Bell the key figures in Zhivkov's removal were Petar Mladenov, who was Minister of 
Foreign Affairs since 1971 and Dobri Dzhurov, the Minister of Defense.62 According to Linz 
and Stepan the two key leaders of the party coup were Mladenov and Lukanov, the 
Minister of Eforeign Economic Relations..  
A senior staff member of the RAND Corporation and Professor of political science 
at the University of California, Berkley and the University of California, Los Angeles Jim 
F.Brown, sees the events in Bulgaria differently: 
The move that overthrew Zhivkov in November was not spontaneous. A 
palace coup, not a popular revolt, it had apparently been in the making for 
about three months, the catalyst being the regime decision in May to expel 
the leaders of the Turkish minority, which had led to the mass exodus. The 
two other main conspirators (apart from Mladenov) were apparently Prime 
Minister Georgi Atanasov, once a protégé of Zhivkov, and Andrei Lukanov, 
minister of foreign economic relations, scion of a well-known communist 
family, who had been kept down by Zhivkov for many years.63 
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Still one thing is certain, the happenings in Bulgaria were with Moscow’s blessings. 
Related, “Mladenov may have stopped in Moscow for discussions with the Soviet leaders 
on his way back from China.”64 
What the Bulgarian population witnessed on November 10th 1989 was a meeting of 
the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo at which Zhivkov "resigned". The “resignation” 
was accepted by the Secretariat. 
People had been living under so much stress and fear that they could not believe it. 
“Bulgaria was indeed ‘out from another yoke’ as a young Sofia student joyfully put it in 
December 1990, referring to the freedom from the Turkish yoke achieved in 1878.”65 Even 
those who were struggling against the regime were mystified. As Deyan Kiyranov, one of the 
key leaders of Ecoglasnost puts it “I did not believe in Zhivkov’s downfall until it happened 
and indeed for some time after.”66  
Despite the efforts to make the resignation appear voluntary it soon became clear 
that this event was fictituous. Zhivkov's former colleagues and "comrades" accused him of 
personal corruption and of establishing a "totalitarian regime". His relatives and closest 
supporters were made to leave their posts in the Party and the state. 
The Party continued to function as usual after Zhivkov’s downfall and even 
attempted to further its hold on the transition process. 
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Shortly after Zhivkov’s withdrawal and Mladenov’s takeover it was not clear 
whether he would continue on a path of perestroika or regime liberalization. The effective 
protests in the country forced him to take measures towards liberalization. An initial step 
towards liberalization was the removal of Article One of the Constitution which declared that 
the communist party is the sole leading force in society.67  
Mladenov and the new leadership promised to promote and develop pluralism in the 
country. They stopped the persecution of ethnic Turks, inviting those who had fled the 
country to return and reclaim their property. They also allowed opposition groups to register 
as legal entities and promised to eliminate the role of the state security forces.68 
The first steps aimed at separation of the Party from the state were undertaken in 
early 1990 when an Extraordinary Party Congress was held. Of note issues on the 
Congress’s agenda were structural and personnel changes. 
Since political life and society are the main focus of this thesis, some important 
events regarding this will be mentioned. Petar Mladenov relinquished the position of Party 
leader and remained solely head of state. “Andrei Lukanov, widely regarded at the time as 
the party's ablest statesman, became Prime minister.”69 . The change of the Party’s name 
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from "Communist" to "Socialist" was a symbol of “the Bulgarian Communist Party half-
heartedly denouncing Marxist principles and Bolshevik practices.”70  
Alexander Lilov, another important figure on the political scene, was elected 
chairman of a restructured Supreme Party Council. Lilov favored younger and better-
educated leaders and denounced the past "totalitarian" practices. Lilov's ideas of Party 
reform and to transform it into a "Euro-socialist" Party type resulted in some dissidents to 
come back to the Party. However, these thoughts were not shared by all Party members. 
According to some the forms and changes were not enough far reaching. This criticism 
resulted in the emergence of other divisions of the Socialist Party, to include Nikolai 
Vasilev's Alternative Socialist Party, Petar- Emil Mitev's "Road to Europe". The aim of these 
divisions was to promote rapid democratization and to look for reconciliation with the West. 
In addition to the changes within the Party after Zhivkov's fall a great number of the 
auxiliary to the Bulgarian Socialist Party organizations collapsed or initiated internal reforms. 
Many of them, such as the Komsomol, the BANU and the Trade Unions, declared their 
independence from the Bulgarian Communist Party control, were replaced by new 
organizations and elected new leadership. The Communist Party cells in the work places 
were disbanded or dissolved. 
The State Security, specifically the Sixth Department which was focused on the 
domestic fight against anti-communism, was of great concern for Zhivkov's successors. 
Immediately personal changes followed. Colonel-General Atanas Semerdzhiev, career 
military, was placed in charge of the security forces. He was given a mandate to depoliticize 
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and downsize the security organs. Department Sixth was disbanded altogether, the task of 
gathering of military intelligence was placed under the Ministry of Defense, while foreign 
intelligence became the responsibility of a "National Intelligence Service" under the head of 
state.71 
During the communist regime a strong linkeage existed between the Party, politics, 
and the military. For the officers corps Party membership was a must with promotion based 
on resolute affiliation. 
Since one of the biggest obstacles for a democratic government is the intervention of 
the army in political life, the new government undertook steps for the depoliticization of the 
army.  In contrast to previous practices servicemen were forbidden to hold political 
affiliations, to attend political rallies in uniform or to undertake political activities within 
barracks. Those officers who wished to continue to be politically active had to resign, and 
between 1990 and 1994, approximately 6,000 officers left the service.72 
Another example that the regime controlled the transition are the Round Table 
Talks. In January 1990 the Communist Party, the UDF and the official BANU started 
negotiations that resulted in a series of agreements related to political and institutional 
reforms. This forum had positive and negative sides. 
The assessment of Venelin Ganev, doctoral candidate in political science at the 
University of Chicago, is highly positive. 
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The importance of these talks was twofold. On the one hand, this series of 
rule-structured,meetings helped contending political elites to open channels 
of communication and attain a measure of mutual trust. On the other hand, 
this incipient consensus regarding procedures and patterns of interaction 
made possible the scheduling of the first multiparty elections for the Great 
National Assembly, upon which the outgoing legislature conferred power to 
adopt a new constitution.73 
 
Another achievement of the Round Table Talks was the adoption of important 
legislation such as The Law on Political Parties and the Election Law. The participants 
agreed on 18 months tenure of the Grand National Assembly (GNA). It was decided that 
the GNA would prepare a new Constitution while functioning as a regular Parliament. The 
parties also agreed to promote civilized and bloodless transition to democracy. In April that 
same year the national Assembly altered the Constitution to create the office of President. 
Control of the transition by the BCP was evident : 
Unlike the Hungarian Round Table, where the democratic opposition first 
held an Opposition Round Table and set out firm principles of negotiation 
even before they agreed to enter negotiations, in Bulgaria the preparatory 
meetings for the Round Table were coordinated by Andrei Lukanov, one of 
the Bulgarian Communist Party leaders of the coup, who ’chaired all 
meetings, set up the agenda and led the discussions’.”74 
 
Another important element of the regime-controlled transition is the election of 
Alexander Lilov as the Communist Party leader after the beginning of the Round Table talks 
in January 1990.That Lilov “was in a position ‘to have total control over power and make 
concessions was considered by the general public as proof of transformation and 
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democratization and was a powerful legitimizing factor’.”75  Bulgarian Communist Party was 
able to convince the population that it was not the Party but Zhivkov, who should be held 
responsible for the troubles of the country. Having the majority in Parliament the BCP set a 
date for elections in June 1990, which was much earlier than the fledging democracy 
envisioned.  
 
D. THE FORCES ON THE BULGARIAN POLITICAL SCENE 
Information about the political parties in Bulgaria will be useful to understand the 
processes after the changes of 1989. There are many small political parties and movements 
but the three major political parties include the Union of Democratic Forces, The Bulgarian 
Socialist party and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.  
1. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 
In March 1990 the Bulgarian communist Party, that prevailed in political life for 
forty-five years, in an attempt to adapt to the changes in Bulgaria and the world renamed 
itself to be Bulgarian Socialist party. The old name was substituted by a new one and a few 
personnel changes followed. 
From 1989 until 997 the BSP made efforts not only to survive but retain power as 
well. “Next to the Serbian Communists, the BSP was the most successful of the former 




Communist Parties in preserving its influence through several changes of government.”76 This 
influence can be attributed to: (a) the consolidated leadership, bound by personal ties, strong 
economic interests and fear to loose power; (b) the strong organization of the Party and 
abundant financial resources from money laundering; (c) successful strategy presenting itself 
as defender of the “socially weak” but “hard” electorate, specifically older people from 
villages and small towns, who identified the Communist Party with their social welfare and 
past success. 
While pretending to allow a range of opinion in compliance with the general spirit of 
democratization, the BSP never tolerated splits in such important moments as elections and 
“always managed to preserve its unity and keep its parliamentary group in strict 
obedience…”77 
Despite the lustration laws that confiscated the property of the totalitarian 
organization, the BSP covered a part of its funds, transferred them abroad, and turned them 
over to trustworthy figures from the old economic nomenklatura. Thus the “Party leadership 
contains individuals from both the ‘red granny’ and ‘red cell phones’.”78 
In its quest to survive and remain in power the BSP rejuvenated the leadership, 
replaced some older functionaries and put forward leaders of second and third generation, 
many of them, like Zhan Videnov, functionaries of the youth organization. In addition for the 
first post-communist elections the BSP chose symbols and platforms that appealed to the 
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voters. In general the BSP remained among the least reformed Communist Parties of all ex 
Warsaw pact countries. 
2. The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) 
The Union of Democratic Forces was established as a coalition of Federation of 
Clubs for the Support of Glasnost and Democracy, Podkrepa Independent Labor 
Confederation, BANU-Nikola Petkov, Social Democrats, Committee for Religious Rights, 
Freedom of Conscience, and Spiritual Values, Independent Association for Defense of 
Human Rights in Bulgaria and other smaller groups.  
As far as UDF’s standing on the political spectrum is concerned: 
At the time of its formation, the UDF was dominated by center-left figures, 
usually intellectuals and former dissidents, many of whom had once been 
members of the BCP. But as the country made its first steps toward 
democratization, many new activists appeared and were farther to the right.” 
79 
 
The Union was led by Zhelju Zhelev and directed by a National Coordination 
Council to include the leaders of the member parties and a few other activists. 
Initially the leadership recruited by co-optation resulted in a lot of tension between 
the member parties. The structures of the UDF were weakly developed at the local level 
with tendency to reproduce the tensions at the center. 
The characteristics of the UDF was that the anti-communist voters identified 
themselves not that much with the different parties within the Union but with its anti-
communist image and program. 
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An important issue for the UDF was to determine whether it would remain a 
coalition of separate parties or transform into a single party. The need for unification and 
party discipline became explicit after UDF’s losses in the 1994 elections. The 1996 
Presidential election and UFD’s victory in them made clear that the UDF could mute the 
internal conflicts and co-operate with other anti-BSP forces in favor of a single candidate.80 
Because of the coming elections a decision was imminent. In February 1997 UDF 
became a party, retained its broad coalition character and achieved agreement with the 
Democratic Party, Moser’s Agrarians, Petar Dertliev’s Social Democrats and some smaller 
groups. 
3. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) 
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms is an ethnic party supported by ethnic 
Turks and other Islamic voters. Since its foundation the MRF has been lead by Akhmed 
Dogan. All attempts to break the Turkish/Islamic vote by establishing parties or fractions 
lead by Nedim Gendzev and Gunar Takhir failed. In Bulgaria there is a general trend 
towards decline of the MRF’s electorate. Dogan was concerned about that decline and on 
the eve of 1997 elections he formed an Alliance for National Salvation, which passed the 4 
percent barrier and entered Parliament.81 Today this political entity balances between the 
two poles of UDF and BSP. 
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4. Other Political Parties  
Many parties have emerged and are still emerging on the Bulgarian political scene. 
Some are so small and insignificant that are not worth mentioning. Parties such as Petar 
Dertliev’s Social Democratic Party, Anastasia Mozer’s Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 
and George Ganchev’s Bulgarian Business Block play an important role in the political life 
today as they did in the early post-communist period. 
In view of the forthcoming elections of 2001 new parties and movements are rising. 
Examples are former Minister of Interior Bogomil Bonev’s “Civil Movement for Bulgaria” 
and the infamous Roma deputy Tzvetelin Kanchev’s.82 “Euro Roma” movement. In addition 
to participation in elections and entering parliament these movements and parties attempt to 
break the established model of three parliamentary represented parties, to enrich the political 
spectrum and give the population more options to choose from. This phenomenon is 
indicative of the process of promotion and consolidation of democracy by civil society that is 
underway in Bulgaria. According to Diamond stimulating the political participation and 
increasing the political skill and efficacy of the citizens is one of the multiple mechanisms via 
which the civil society influences democratization.83 
E. THE JUNE 1990 ELECTIONS 
In the 1990 June elections for Grand National Assembly although many of the 
political parties were represented UDF and BSP were the primary contestants. Today the 
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situation is the same. These elections laid the basis of a new beginning. "Perhaps most 
significantly these election set an enduring precedent for the orderly resolution of elite 
contention. Since June 1990, the ballot box has been seen, however grudgingly, as the sole 
route to political power.”84 
The UDF started its campaign with a high level of confidence. Its presumption was 
that if the people were given the chance to vote freely the population would automatically 
reject the BSP. 
The BSP was striving to distance itself from its past. BSP’s spokesmen continuously 
denounced “totalitarianism” and stressed that Zhivkov’s downfall was due to the 
functionaries of the Socialist Party. The old slogans and portraits of party leaders were 
replaced by new symbols – a red rose, a cartoon with a thumb-up gesture, and a slogan 
reading “Good Luck for Bulgaria”. In addition BSP activists propagated among pensioners 
that they would be seriuosly endangered if UDF comes into power.85 
Despite UDF’s enthusiasm BSP won the first free elections  
In June 1990, the first free elections for Grand National Assembly in 
Bulgaria for fifty years were a disappointment for enthusiastic followers of 
the anti-Communist UDF, because the socialists won a significant majority. 
It was widely accepted that, in the week before the election, the BSP 
exercised considerable intimidation over the electorate, particularly over the 
rural constituencies, where there were hints that reformists in Sofia would be 
incapable of rule and would refuse to pay pensions and other benefits.”86 
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The UDF did win in the big cities, particularly the capital and was supported by the 
professionals and the younger generation. 
No matter what the elections results read one thing was certain – the Bulgarians did 
not want to live under communism any more. This determination contributed to boost up the 
weak opposition which after the defeat in the elections experienced great difficulties to 
consolidate. “The most intense explosion of opposition in civil society occurred after, not 
before the election and for a while the streets seemed to displace the parliament as the 
center of politics.”87 
In many cities around the country and particularly in the capital Sofia were 
established “communist free zones” and tent cities. The strike of the students from “St. Cyril 
and Methodius” University in Sofia spread to the provinces. More and more the protests 
focused upon a statement made by President Petar Mladenov the preceding December, 
who in the course of a demonstration in front of the National Assembly told the Minister of 
Defense “ We’d better call for the tanks.”88 In spite of the charges of the BSP and the 
President himself that this was a tape produced by the opposition, after the authenticity of 
the tape was proved Petar Mladenov had to step down. This event reduced the power and 
credibility of the BSP. 
The next step was to appoint Mladenov’s successor. The Grand National Assembly 
voted several times but no one gained the necessary two-thirds majority. After some of the 
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nominees withdrew their candidacies in favor of Zhelju Zhelev, he became the President 
elect. Zhelev is the first democratic President in the contemporary history of Bulgaria. His 
two tenures open up a new page in the political life of Bulgaria. 
F. THE PERIOD 1990-1995 
The biggest reshuffling on the Bulgarian political scene took part from 1990 until 
1995. Red governments were replaced by blue, they in turn were followed by expert ones. 
The country experienced difficulties in finding the right track. In many cases there was 
discrepancy between people’s hopes and the practical results provided by the politicians. 
Instead of changes, progress and democratization the attention was focused on the past.  
The Bulgarian social scientist Ekaterina Nikova describes this period thusly: 
‘During the whole period of 1989-1992, Bulgarian politics remained in a 
phase of prepolitics or antipolitics. Revolutionary rhetoric was kept alive, 
together with an anachronistic paranoic preoccupation with the past, the 
KGB, Moscow and various conspiracies’.89 
 
The official victory of the BSP in the June 1990 elections did not result in 
consolidation of the Socialist Party’s power. Internal as well as external factors were 
working in the opposite direction. The first blow came with the election of UDF Chairman 
Zhelju Zhelev as President, the second factor that shattered BSP’s standing in the eyes of 
the population was Mladenov’s behavior which resulted in his resignation. BSP’s Prime 
Minister Lukanov was not performing well either. The attacks on him were coming from 
within the BSP and particularly Alexander Lilov. In addition Lukanov had dragged the 
country into financial troubles. “ He had spent the last of Bulgaria’s hard currency reserves 
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to prevent a drop of salaries and pensions before the June elections, and when it became 
impossible to continue this policy, Bulgaria’s economy and standard of living went into a free 
fall. The ‘hungry winter’ of 1990-91 approached.”90 The strike movements because of the 
unbearable conditions in the country resulted in his resignation. 
In December 1990 the unallied to any political party Dimitar Popov formed a 
coalition government with the participation of both the BSP and the UDF. 
Mladenov’s and Lukanov’s resignations contributed to the swing of public opinion in 
favor of the opposition. This support for the opposition resulted in its victory in the 1991 
elections held in compliance with the new Bulgarian Constitution. Since the UDF won with a 
very small majority, the new UDF leader Philip Dimitrov formed a government with the 
parliamentary support of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. The new government 
undertook measures to reinstate the property nationalized in the 1940s, to return the land to 
the peasants after the co-opertaive farms were liquidated. It passed laws aimed to 
encourage and facilitate foreign investments, reform of the banking system and privatisation 
of the industry. The people were getting poorer and poorer and “the reforms, based entirely 
on a monetarist approach or ‘shock therapy’ caused social discontent. After the MRF 
withdrew their support in the late 1992, the Dimitrov government fell in December 1992.”91 
Other reasons, apart from the harsh economic measures, contributed to the failure of 
Philip Dimitrov’s government. The first one is the split within the Union of Democratic 
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Forces themselves. The division between “dark blue” and “light blue” happened as early as 
the end of 1990. The “dark blues” “had little patience with their more leftist colleagues, 
whom they suspected and often accused of being communist dupes or agents.”92 While the 
“dark blues” continued to pursue their opponents, another group, comprised of intellectuals, 
founders of the UDF established the “light-blue” UDF Liberals. Since originally the UDF 
was founded with the idea of uniting different groups with various views to fight communism 
this split resulted in break ups in the constituent organizations. No matter that during 
Dimitrov’s government the UDF was more unified than before the split, the tensions within 
could still be felt. An example is the tense relations between the UDF government and the 
President who came from one and the same party. But the first democratically elected 
President “ Zhelev had made no secret of his sympathy toward the ‘light-blues’, the groups 
that had withdrawn from the UDF.”93 Another example of how tight the relations between 
President and government were is the so called “Boyana meadows press conference” when 
President Zhelev publicly scolded the Parliamentary majority for being at war with everyone. 
He also made some personal remarks towards Stefan Savov the Chairman of the National 
Assembly and chairperson of one of the big coalition parties.94 
In addition some of the priorities of Dimitrov’s government were not well accepted 
by either some influential political forces or by the population at large. A mistake was done 
in the economic field for example.”The policy of ‘restitution first’ both delayed more 
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important economic reform and provoked a political reaction, for it mainly benefited 
Bulgarians, including emigres, who belonged to or were descended from wealthy families in 
the era before World War II, several of whom were UDF deputies.”95 
Dimitrov’s government was not successful in the realization of the highest priority of 
”complete decommunization” either. While the prosecution of former communists like Todor 
Zhivkov, Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov and the Economic Minister Stoyan Ovcharov was 
broadly supported, some controversial measures such as denying pensions to people whose 
careers were in the BCP or security organs, or not recognizing the validity of any degrees 
earned in Soviet universities and high schools, were regarded as unfair and became highly 
unpopular. 
After the fall of Dimitrov’s government in order to appoint a new government the 
President had to start negotiations with the parties represented in Parliament. First he 
addressed the largest group in the National Assembly – the UDF. It re-nominated Philip 
Dimitrov, who was no more an acceptable candidate for the BSP and the MRF. When the 
BSP had to nominate a candidate the MRF refused to vote for any of the BSP’s candidates. 
It became clear that the President would have to appoint a care taker government. The 
MRF put forward Ljuben Berov, a historian and economist currently taking the position of 
Chief Economic Advisor to the President. Berov did not belong to any party and “pledged 
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to lead the country out of its ‘crisis of confrontation’ by forming a ‘government of national 
responsibility.” 96 
Berov’s government was formally set under a MRF mandate but his government 
enjoyed the support of the BSP. The major task assigned to this government was 
privatisation. Although it survived a great number of confidence votes in September 1994 
Berov had to resign. One of the biggest flaws was privatisation. 
In fact, this is when hidden privatisation started. A small number of business 
conglomerates with growing power started to appear, which were thought 
to be dominated by former Communist or secret Service officials. The 
conglomerates made sizeable profits from exploiting the financial weakness 
of the state sector. They had considerable influence among politicians, and it 
was assumed that they would be adversely affected if economic reforms 
intensified. This is why they exercised powerful influence to limit economic 
restructuring.97 
 
In mid October 1994 Berov handed over the Premiership to Reneta Indzhova. One 
of the major goals of her government was to prepare new elections scheduled for December 
18, 1994. 
The UDF, the BSP and the MRF were the major contestants in the 1994 elections. 
The population was tired of the constant political insecurity in the country caused by the 
great turn over of governments within a very short period of time. The economic situation 
was bad. Bulgaria had become the country of Multigroup an organization laundring the 
money of the former communist party. In addition to privatisation of the biggest and most 
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prosperous enterprises Multigroup started to buy politicians and ensured access to the 
highest levels of power.  
The UDF was undermined by internal disputes and “as one deputy argued, the UDF 
was turning into a sect of true believers divorced from political reality.”98 
The MRF continued to loose part of its electorate, which anyway was not big, with 
more and more ethnic Turks leaving for Turkey. Another reason for withdrawal of support 
was the disappointment of the ethnic Turks with the rather lavish life style of their leader 
Akhmed Dogan and other members of the party elite. 
While the UDF and MRF had hard times finding the right way and approach to their 
electorates the BSP was getting ready for its lion’s jump. At the Fortieth Congress of the 
BSP held in December 1991 the then leader of the BSP Lilov resigned and threw his 
support to thirty-two year old, former Komsomol activist Zhan Videnov. Often times youth 
is a virtue but not in Videnov’s case. 
Until his election as BSP chairman, which came as a surprise even to 
himself, Zhan Videnov had a little experience with political leadership. In his 
initial public appearances he appeared hesitant and ill at ease. His election 
seemed one further step in his party’s continuing decline.99 
 
As far as his style and approach are concerned 
As party leader, Videnov favored people like himself, building a core of 
young, well-educated technocrats, usually from the former Komsomol and 
often from the Plovdiv apparatus. Representatives of the older generation, 
whether reformers or conservatives, were gradually relegated to the status 
of backbenchers.100 
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With new slogans about European Social Democracy and young people at leading 
positions BSP’s chances for success in the elections had increased. Two other psychological 
factors added to the BSP victory in the 1994 elections. The population at large was 
disappointed with the UDF performance and the tough economic measures undertaken by 
the various governments. Related, in Bulgaria socialism was not defeated and a great 
number of people still believed in the socialist idea and those who promoted it. 
The majority won by the BSP was called ‘nostalgic’ vote, with many people 
looking back to the times of ‘stability’. It also reflected disillusionment with 
‘reform’ associated with the UDF and its unfortunate short government in 
1992, for which there was little to show except continuing economic 
deterioration.101 
 
As a result of the BSP’s victory at the December 1994 elections in January 1995 
Zhan Videnov was appointed Prime Minsiter. Videnov’s Premiership marked the beginning 
of the end of socialism in Bulgaria. 
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V.  THE END OF SOCIALISM 
A. THE VIDENOV GOVERNMENT 
In their election campaign of 1994 “the Socialists rejected the so-called ‘right 
transition’ and supported the idea of the ‘left alternative’ i.e. fast privatisation, protection for 
the most vulnerable members of society, increase in incomes.”102 
Videnov and his government, enjoying a solid Parliamentary majority, were 
supposed to undertake measures in that direction. Instead of commencing serious and hard 
work the government was only announcing different plans and procrastinating the real 
reforms. The economy which so far was not well off became even worse. 
By the end of 1996, Bulgaria had become the top-contender for the title 
‘worst-managed country in Europe.’ During that year, inflation hit the 300 
percent mark and the GNP shrank by a staggering 9 percent-making 
Bulgaria a dramatic exception to the general East European trend toward 
stabilization and growth. Between January 1996 and January 1997, the 
average monthly salary fell almost tenfold from $118 to $12, while the 
average pension went from $47 to $4 a month over the same period. 
Bulgaria, a land at peace, actually sank below the economic level of strife-
ravaged Bosnia and Albania.103 
 
The Socialist government’s view on privatisation was a peculiar one. Both Berov as 
well as Videnov believed that the state should control all the economy’s important sectors 
and poured billions of leva into faltering state-owned enterprises. The new “mass 
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privatisation” schemes and “social justice criteria”104  formulated by Videnov were symbolic 
of the anti-reformist stubbornness. 
The worst damage to the economy was done by “Videnov’s circle of friends.”105 It 
comprised of former communist-youth activists for whom the Party was a vehicle for 
capitalizing on strategic opportunities. They quickly transfered state resources into private 
hands and arranging everything by a single phone call. The access to power and national 
wealth brought to them on a silver plate by Videnov gave several dozen select families a life 
of luxury. Numerous examples can be given of how Videnov and his “circle of friends” were 
robbing the country and the population with the worst ones related to the export of grain and 
collapse of the banking system. 
In late 1995, the government licensed several companies owned by 
Videnov’s ‘advisors’ to export unspecified amounts of grain. Several weeks 
later, Bulgaria was thrown into the depths of a severe grain shortage. 
Hungry citizens had to wait in line for hours to get meager rations of ever 
more expensive bread. All throughout that same year, the government had 
coerced the National Bank to ‘refinance’ private banks, which then 
extended ‘loans’ to hand picked businesses controlled by Videnov’s 
personal friends. Billions of leva vanished. When the inevitable collapse of 
the banking system ensued, in the summer of 1996, 80 percent of all 
personal savings were wiped out. A ‘special fund’ created by the 
government in order to finance the restructuring of faltering state enterprises 
disappeared when it was ‘discovered’ that the fund was registered under the 
name of one of Videnov’s ministers, who was using it as his personal 
checking account.106 
 
The common Bulgarians suffered from these undertakings. To survive they had to go 
back to the non-market forms of exchanges in kind instead of payments. In addition during 
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that period a large-scale emigration ensued. Almost half a million departed out of 8,000,000 
population in Bulgaria.107 Those who “temporarily” left do not count in the statistics. 
Something had to be done. The strongest opponent to the political cynicism of the 
BSP and Videnov’s government in particular was President Zhelev. He pointed out the 
organic linkeage of the BSP to organized crime, appealed the governments’ legislation to the 
Constitutional Court, and pushed  the government to unequivocally state Bulgaria’s desire 
for membership in NATO and the other European structures.  
The criticism of Videnov’s government coming from within the BSP was gaining 
momentum. The tension and demands for Videnov’s resignation increased at the end of 
1996 when UDF candidate Peter Stoyanov was elected President. A plenary meeting of the 
BSP Supreme Council gave Videnov a narrow vote of confidence, eighty-seven to sixty-
nine. The majority of the high-ranking party members were unanimous that they would rather 
split the party than allow Videnov to continue as a Prime Minister.108 
The BSP was looking forward to govern the country with or without Videnov but 
the population was not willing to give it yet another chance. The difficult economic situation 
brought the Bulgarians to the brink and the population at large started rallies and 
demonstrations all over the country. The rallies began before Videnov’s resignation on 21 
December 1996 and continued almost until the end of February 1997, when a care taker 
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government was appointed. CNN’s correspondent Christiane Amanpour’s coverage from 
15 January 1997 reveals the situation in the country: 
Protesters have been on the streets of Sofia for 10 straight days. Taxi 
drivers take their symbolic hour-long strikes to the steps of Parliament. And 
Bulgaria's main labor unions are considering nationwide walk outs."Throw 
the red rubbish out," the demonstrators chant. They blame the ruling 
Socialists for continuing old Communist policies that have brought Bulgaria 
to the brink of economic collapse.109  
 
As a result of the mass demonstrations headed by the opposition the BSP had to 
relinquish. When the late Nikolai Dobrev was nominated to form the next BSP government 
he returned the mandate to the President for the sake of social peace and stability in 
Bulgaria. Then the President in compliance with the Constitution started negotiations with the 
second biggest party in Parliament – the UDF. The UDF appointed Sofia’s mayor Stefan 
Sofianski as Prime Minsiter. The goal of this interim government, apart from the attempts to 
stabilize the economic situation of the country, was to prepare for the parliamentary elections 
held on 17 April 1997. These elections were a sweeping victory for the UDF. Ivan Kostov, 
leader of the UDF, became Prime minister. 
B. DEMOCRATIZATION AT FULL SPEED 
In his pre-election campaign Kostov had three major priorities: 90 percent 
privatisation by the end of the year, applying for membership in NATO and EU as well as 
state withdrawal from the economy.110 
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The nation needed a strong and determined government to take it out of the debacle 
of the previous years. 
With the elections of April 1997, Bulgaria has entered a period of hope and 
recovery. The newly installed government headed by UDF leader Ivan 
Kostov has seemed fully determined to navigate the troubled ship of 
Bulgarian democracy safely through the treacherous currents and eddies of 
reform. A Currency board has been instituted with a view to strengthening 
fiscal discipline. Inflation has been tamed. There has been a sustained effort 
to curb organized crime and to put notorious crime figures behind bars. Full 
membership in all European structures (including NATO) has gone 
unambiguously to the top of the foreign-policy agenda.111 
 
The first order of business of the new government was a very clear picture of where 
should the country stand within the four years of its tenure. Of note the conditions in Bulgaria 
were more favorable than ever. For the first time since 1989 the country is run by a 
President, Prime minister and Parliamentary majority from one and the same political party 
with common beliefs and values. They were fully supported by the population in free and fair 
elections, which Diamond points out as one of the most important characteristics of 
democracy.112 This was a practical step towards completed democratic transition when “the 
executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to 
share power with other bodies de jure.”113 
The changes in Bulgaria started as early as 1989 but only after the elections in 1997 
the major efforts to consolidate democracy began slowly though steadily. 
                                                             
111Venelin Ganev, Bulgaria’s Symphony of Hope ( Journal of Democracy 8.4).Available [Online]:< 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v008/8.4ganev.html, [4 December 2000], p.8. 
112Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy, Towards Consolidation  (The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999), p.3. 
113Juan Linz &Alfred Stepan , Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation   (The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1996), p.3. 
 61 
 
Shortly after coming into power in 1997 the UDF government set its agenda – 
Program of the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria 1997 – 2001, or the so-called 
Program 2001.114 It provides the Government’s visions on important issues such as the 
future of the country, institutional building of democratic Bulgaria and order and security for 
the Bulgarian citizens. The document also focuses on the place and role of the country in the 
world and its integration into the European and Trans-Atlantic security structures. The 
largest portion of Program 2001 deals with the financial and economic reform of Bulgaria, 
describing in details what will be done for the financial stabilization, structural reform and 
revival of the Bulgarian agriculture together with all the other important trends in the 
economic field. The Government focuses a great deal of its efforts on the social policy and 
the health of the nation as well as education, youth, preservation of the nature and the 
Bulgarian spirit.  
After many years of imitations of reforms now there is at least a chance 
Bulgaria  to take the right way and get back to normal life in the broadest 
sense of the word. We, the Ministers of the Government of the Republic of 
Bulgaria, take that high responsibility before all Bulgarians, before our 
children and ourselves.115 
 
This Program of the Government is also an essential step towards consolidating 
democracy, because it realizes the three tasks of each fragile democracy “democratic 
deepening, political institutionalization, and regime performance.”116 
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As a result of the government’s focus on macro-economic management under 
international supervision encouraging results were achieved. The yearly inflation was reduced 
to one-digit numbers, the national currency was kept fixed to the German Mark, and salaries 
and pensions, as well as the economy as a whole started to grow. The government also 
committed itself to an accelerated privatisation process. By closing several loss-making 
state-owned enterprises the sympathy of Western financial institutions was won. ”Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) during 1997 totalled $ 502 million, or nearly 39 % of the 1.293 
billion FDI since 1992.”117  
The support of the Western financial institutions is only a part of the equation. This 
step contributed to the consolidation of democracy via one of its essential tools – evaluating 
democracy. According to Diamond the satisfaction with democracy is strongly linked to the 
personal economic assessments, the higher and the better the economic perspectives the 
greater the satisfaction and support with democracy. 
The two major foreign policy issues of the current government are membership in 
NATO and the European Union. 
The country was late in declaring its will to join the Alliance, making this statement in 
1997, and in spite of the fact that Bulgaria was not among the invited in the 1995-1999 
round of NATO Enlargement the leadership did not give up. A number of measures were 
undertaken by the Government as a whole and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense 
in particular to achieve the goal of memebrship. Apart from introducing amendments to the 
Defense Bill which are reflecting the new realities, for the very first time a Military Doctrine 
                                                             
117Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Charles Graybow, Nations in Transit 1998Transaction 
Publishers, New Brunswick and London, 1999), p.175.  
 63 
 
and a National Security Concept were developed and adopted. The military started a 
process of downsizing taking into account that there is no threat for the security and stability 
of the country and to meet NATO membership requirements. From a total of 110,000 the 
Bulgarian armed forces in the year 2003 would be 45,000.118  Related, efforts are done to 
achieve interoperability with the NATO armies in communications and language training.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been proactive in promoting Bulgaria’s initiatives 
aimed to improve the stability in the Balkans. The regular meetings and good personal 
relations between the experts and the ministers from the region contribute to this end.  
As an example of its commitment to strengthen the stability in the Balkans and as a 
proof of its desire to join the Alliance, Bulgaria participated in SFOR and is now taking part 
in KFOR as far as it can afford it financially. During the 1989-1999 Kosovo crisis the 
country not only provided NATO planes with access to its airspace, but provided food and 
shelter for the refugees in Radusha refugee camp, located in neighboring Macedonia. 
In terms of EU membership Bulgaria is taking steps to boost up its economy and 
bring various aspects of its legislature into accordance with European Union standards. 
While the membership in NATO seemed much closer, the chances to join the EU were 
much feebler. As a result of the hard work and determination of the government in 
December 1999 Bulgaria was invited to start the accession negotiations. The words of 
Prime Minister Kostov were indicative of how the future events would unfold. 
After the invitation to start the negotiation we should not stop working. We 
should not forget that for the Bulgarians the very invitation for EU 
membership does not change their lives. In order to make a difference, the 
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Government, now that the invitation is a fact, has to pursue other goals, 
which would attract investments and help the people feel the difference.119 
 
Aiming to improve the work of the state apparatus and to prepare the country for 
the prospective membership the Prime minister made changes in the government and 
replaced ten ministers. In addiion the government continued to work on the privatisation, to 
curb criminality and to align the country’s legislation to that of the EU. Apart form these 
measures, as Foreign Minister Nadezhda Mihailova states, the government has done a lot of 
lobbying.120 The results followed suit. An year later, on 1 December  2000 the EU Council 
of Ministers decided to take Bulgaria out of the “black” Shengen list and no more require 
visas for Bulgarian citizens when they travel around Europe.  
This current government has achieved a lot but its success with the EU membership 
is among the outstanding ones. The EU membership is demanding effort and yet much has to 
be done. In spite of the hard work ahead this successful endeavor of the government 
contributed to the strengthening of democracy by increasing the confidence in the institutions, 
which is an important factor of consolidating democracy, the way Diamond sees it.121 
The support for and trust in the institutions is also demonstrated in the polls that are 
often done in the country. According to these polls among the leading most trusted 
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institutions are the Presidency, the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly, followed 
by the Armed Forces.122  
Today, due to the work the UDF government has done and the results it had 
achieved, democracy is legitimate. It enjoys a country wide support of the population, and 
the people are absolutely confident that it is working in Bulgaria. In addition there is no 
nostalgia for the authoritarian past. This is in complia nce with one of the important factors in 
consolidating democracy, as described by Diamond.”Democratic consolidation is most 
evident and secure when support for democracy is not only unconditional but also shared by 
all major political groups and tendencies.”123  
The stable political situation in the country, the strive towards improving the 
economy, hence increasing the living standard of the population, as well as the variety of 
amendments to already existing and developing new laws, further relate to the three 
dimensions of a consolidated democracy as seen by Linz and Stepan, namely behavioral, 
attitudinal and constitutional.124 
In summary it can be said that now “democracy has become ‘the only game in 
town’”125 in Bulgaria, since the processes are irreversible and there is no way back. 
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The UDF should hopefully continue its good work more over the 2001 
Parliamentary elections will be held this coming June. 
The good civil – military relations in the country contributed to the afore mentioned 
results and achievements. Because of their significance the following subchapter describes 
the evolution of civil – military relations in Bulgaria. 
 
C. CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS 
Since “civil-military relations as one of the indicators and factors for the 
consolidation of democracy in the national and international societies”126 are of great 
importance, this thesis should focus on that particular domain.  
The issue of civil-military relations can be broken into three intertwined fields: 
democratic control, civil-military relations and defense reform. 
Of note, in the case of Bulgaria the motivation for working civil military relations and 
implementation of democratic control, is the integration of the country in EU, WEU and 
NATO, as well as the rule of law.127  
The first steps toward changes in the field of civil military relations were taken as 
early as 1991, with the Soviet civil-military system as point of departure, but their real 
improvement started in 1997 after the UDF government came into power. 
                                                             
126Plamen Pantev, The new national Security Environment and its Impact  on the Civil-Military 
Relations in Bulgaria (ISIS, 1997), Available [Online]: 





Account also should be taken of the fact that in the case of Bulgaria efficient civilian 
control over the military is a key prerequisite for good civil-military relations. The first reason 
is that the military not only in Bulgaria but in general is very conservative, a closed society, 
relatively isolated from the population. Second the Bulgarian military are highly reluctant to 
accept any changes. Partly this is due to the fact that before 1989 the military were the 
“spoiled child” of society and enjoyed a number of privileges ranging from high salaries to 
low cost governmental housing. Quite naturally they perceive any move towards a change as 
a threat to their status quo. The Bulgarian military in the beginning of the 1990s were also 
very unwilling to accept a civilian leadership in a domain, which they considered initially as 
their own. 
The year 1991 is important for the development of the civil-military relations in 
Bulgaria since then the first civilian Minister of Defense was appointed in more than 50 
years. For the very first time civilians were entering the Ministry of Defense and were taking 
key, leadership positions. With a new democratic government, that came into power in 
1991, and a civilian Minister of Defense the defense establishment of the country was on its 
way of reforms. In the period 1992 –1994 several drafts of a new Defense Bill, reflecting 
the changes in the world and the country and their impact on the military were developed. In 
1995 a new Defense Bill was adopted. In the following years further amendments were 
made to that Defense Bill. A major contribution to that has the democratic government that 
came into power in 1997.The amendments are related to the role of the civilian Minister of 
Defense, who gained broad authority over the General Staff.128 
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The institutions of utmost importance for the functioning of the civil – military 
relations in the Republic of Bulgaria, in hierarchical order, are the President, the Council of 
Ministers, the National Assembly as a representative of the legislature through its National 
Security Committee, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. 
The head of state is the President129 who is also a commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces; he declares mobilization and state of war. As the highest-ranking official in the state 
he is authorized to appoint and dismiss the higher command of the Armed Forces on a 
motion from the Council of Ministers.130 In 1991 the President created a Military Cabinet to 
help him in his duties as a Supreme commander. Under the Petar Stoyanov presidency a 
former Chief of the General Staff became one of his advisors. In the last years the 
importance of such a Cabinet was apparently increased since it provides the President with 
a team of experienced professionals who have a high level of expertise in the military area. A 
substantial reinforcement to that team in terms of experience and expertise is Gueorgui 
Ananiev, who was a Minister of Defense since February 1997 till December 1999. Now he 
is a special advisor to the President on defense issues.   
As a chairman of the Consultative National Security Council, which includes the 
Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Interior, their deputies and the Chief of the 
General Staff, the President has the right to possess and to require from the state institutions 
any information he deems necessary, that is related to the national defence and security.  
Both the Constitution and the Defense Bill have chapters outlining the presidential 
prerogatives as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.  The Defense Bill repeats the 
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basic text of the Constitution that the President is a Supreme Commander-in-chief,131 but 
also adds several important rights. For example the President is entitled to approve strategic 
plans for the activities of the Armed Forces, to declare a higher level of readiness for some 
specific units or for the whole Armed Forces.132  
The National Assembly, being the legislative power has fundamental functions in the 
national security area and plays an important role in the functioning of the civil-military 
relations in the country through its structures and more particularly through the National 
Security Committee. The rights of the National Assembly are stated in the Constitution. It is 
the only institution, which can declare war and make peace. It is the body that allows the use 
of the Armed Forces outside the country, it permits the stationing of foreign troops on 
Bulgarian territory or their passing through it, it also ratifies international treaties in the field of 
defense and security, and of course has the right to declare a state of emergency.133  It 
determines the total number of the Armed Forces, under motion of the Council of Ministers. 
The Parliament adopts the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine, and is 
authorised to establish or close military academies and schools.134 
The Parliament approves the defense budget as part of the state budget and has the 
right to question the Minister of Defense on various topics, which is a very important tool of 
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civilian control. Every Friday there are hearings in the Parliament and very often the Minister 
of Defense is among those answering the questions of the MPs from the different political 
parties. 
Attached to the Parliament, the National Security Committee was created in 1991 
with the aim to provide parliamentary control over the Armed Forces.  Its members are 
MPs who work on the drafts of the defense bills and make evaluation reports on national 
security issues. 
The Council of Ministers is responsible for the public order and national security and 
exercises overall guidance of the state administration and the Armed Forces.135 According 
to Article 32 of the Defense Bill the government determines and implements the defense 
policy and is in control of the defense spending and the use of the allocated defense budget. 
It approves and adopts the plans for the build-up and organisation of the Bulgarian Armed 
Forces. It also adopts the Rules for Professional Military Service, an Act, prescribing the 
rights and obligations of the professional military personnel.  The last amendment to the 
Defense Bill in 1997 gave to the Government wide prerogatives in terms of sending unarmed 
troops outside the territory of the country for humanitarian, educational, or other peaceful 
mission.  It is much better compared to the previous practice when decisions were taken on 
a case by case basis.  
Among its various obligations the Government has to present an annual report on the 
Defense and Armed Forces status.136 
                                                             
135Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Art. 105 
136That was a part of the 1997 amendments on the Defence and Armed Forces Law - Art. 32a. 
 71 
 
The Council of Ministers contributes to working civil-military relations through 
appointing a civilian Minister of Defense, who is a member of the Government and co-
ordinates his activities with the Cabinet. 
The Defense Bill137 stipulates that not only the Minister but also his deputies should 
be civilians. As of today there are four Deputy Ministers of Defense: the first one is 
responsible for the defense budget, the second deals with the human resources issues, which 
means that he is directly working on the personnel policy of the Ministry, the third one is 
responsible for the military-economic bloc and last but not least is the deputy minister for 
defense policy and plans and international cooperation. They all assist the Minister of 
Defense in his day to day obligations and work and share the burden of running the defense 
establishment. The Minister of Defense is in charge of the implementation of the Government 
policy in the armed forces and has the full control over the General Staff. His functional 
duties and authorities as well as those of his deputies and the Chief of the General Staff are 
stipulated in Defense Bill.  
In the course of the last five years the process of appointing civilians to key positions 
in the Ministry of Defense continued. The idea was to establish a civilian structure in the 
Ministry which is representative of the executive power and is in compliance with the Law 
on State Administration adopted in 1999. 
In view of implementing civilian control over the military the personnel of the 
Ministry of Defense is almost twice bigger, than those working for the General Staff 
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In the General Staff priority is given to the military personnel and almost all key 
positions are taken by military, which improves and contributes to the civil-military relations 
within the defense establishment, since these people coordinate their actions, work together 
on a daily basis and learn from each other. 
The Chief of the General Staff, who is appointed by the President under ministerial 
motion, is responsible for the day to day leadership of the Army. He has no political powers. 
He signs ministerial orders, related to the Armed Forces. His duties are stated in the 
Defense Bill and are related to the organisational building, preparation and maintaining of the 
mobilisation readiness of the Bulgarian Army as well as the participation of the Bulgarian 
Army units in peacekeeping, humanitarian, rescue, and other operations outside the national 
territory.138 
Article 74 of the Defense Bill clearly states that the Chief of Staff is directly 
subordinated to the Minister of Defense. The Defense Bill, amended in 1997 also stipulates 
that the rotational principle should be applied in appointing the Chief of the General Staff. 
The tenure is three years with a chance for a second term and the Chief of the General staff 
is appointed among representatives of the Air Force, Navy and the Army.139 
Account should also be taken of the efforts made by the leadership of the Ministry 
of Defense in view of improving civil-military relations. On the one hand are the endeavors 
to educate and train more civilians on defense issues, so that they have a better 
understanding of the way the military mechanism functions. On the other hand is the training 
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and education of the military, which helps them understand the need of civilian control and 
the clues to well functioning civil-military relations. This education and training is done 
through participation in workshops and seminars, organized by institutions and countries with 
well established traditions in that particular aspect. 
Apart from that in 1999 two studies were conducted, dealing with aspects of the 
civil military relations. The first one was a result of the request of the then Bulgarian Minister 
of Defense addressed to Defense Secretary Cohen for assistance in studying the civilian 
oversight over the military. The study was conducted by a joint US-Bulgarian team lead by 
Major-General Kiefenaar. In the course of 1999 the US team visited Bulgaria several times 
and had meetings with all the key factors in the implementation of the civilian oversight over 
the military, which is one of the preconditions of the civil-military relations. They had several 
meetings with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the 
Chief of the General Staff, the National Security Committee in Parliament, as well as talks 
and discussions with experts from the MoD and the GS. During one of their visits to the 
country they traveled around and visited a number of military facilities and talked to a great 
number of officers and conscripts. Such a study was not done before. It was the first of its 
kind. The results of the study and the recommendations were presented in a Report, which 
in July 1999 Secretary Cohen handed to the then Minister of Defense. The findings and 
recommendations of the report were of great help in defining the size of the Armed Forces, 
and will be of great help in the work aiming to improve the functions of the two institutions 
most explicitly representing the civil military relations, namely the MoD and the GS. 
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Another study conducted in the country was done by the DMSC of the UK 
Ministry of Defense. It has to do with the integrated structure of the Ministry of Defense and 
the General Staff. The report of the study was ready in March 2000. The Bulgarian 
institutions have still a lot to learn. This study contributes to a better organization of the 
structures, finding the right balance between them, as well as getting rid of the duplicating 
ones. Moreover the UK MoD has the best experience and expertise in working in an 
integrated civil-military structure. 
Based on the expert advise of these two studies and the expertise the Bulgarian 
MoD and GS have gained so far they are continuing the work to permanently establish the 
parameters of civil-military relations, which will sufficiently contribute to and improve their 
work. 
In summary: 
Both society and its military are much closer to the realization of the so 
called "liberal bargain", speaking in the terms of Prof. Joseph Nye, the 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs of 
the United States. This "bargain" is supposed to define in a stable way the 
specific rights and responsibilities for the military and for the civilian 
leadership. The contents of the evolving bargain is the recognition by the 
military that they are accountable to the rule of law, agreement to remain 
nonpartisan and respect civilian authority. On the part of the civilians - they 
must respect the special role of the military in society as long as the military 
profession is needed by society, must provide an adequate funding for the 
respective and mutually agreed appropriate military roles and missions. A 
common obligation is expected to be the education of both military and 
civilians in such a way that they can interact positively with each other for the 
benefit of the society and the state.140  
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
For forty-five years the Bulgarians had had a difficult life as a result of the communist 
regime installed on September 9, 1944. The Communist party, closely linked to the state, 
extensively developed relations with the other communist countries - members of the former 
Warsaw Pact and mainly with the former Soviet Union. The country had to go through 
Stalin’s personality cult, tight political discipline and more or less low living standard. 
Because of the mentality of Todor Zhivkov, who ran the country for thirty-five 
years, his excellent personal relationships with the Soviet leaders and more particularly 
Michail Gorbachev and last but not least due to Zhivkov’s subservience, for decades 
Bulgaria was considered an indivisible part of the former Soviet Union in terms of foreign 
policy and economy. 
Luckily the changes that took place in the world had their impact on Bulgaria as 
well. The Communist party coup on November 10, 1989 and Zhivkov’s resignation opened 
new vistas for the nation. The country slowly but steadily took the path of democratization, 
which by no means is an easy one.  
Within eleven years Bulgaria had had three Parliaments and eleven Governments. 
Some of them lasted only few months, others a little bit longer. Some of them did a lot of 
good for the country, others brought a lot of unrest and poverty. A great deal of reshuffling 
and a lot of ups and downs characterize the political life in that period, but what really 
matters is that  
In fact, within a very short period the country experienced changes without 
precedent in its history, and in a completely peaceful way. A breakthrough 
was made in Bulgaria’s international isolation. And, with the savage ethnic 
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conflicts on her western border, Bulgaria has earned a reputation as an 
‘island of stability’ in the Balkan Peninsula.141 
 
The will and determination of the country and its 1997 government to join the world 
values of peace, security, stability and prosperity as represented by NATO and the EU 
undoubtedly define the focus of the efforts. A lot has been done and yet still has to be done 
so that Bulgaria becomes an equal partner in these organizations.  
Bulgaria is also working hard to improve the security, stability and confidence in the 
region. The country more and more plays the role of “security zone” on the Balkans. A case 
in point is the participation of Bulgaria in the Multinational Peacekeeping Forces, which are a 
product of the joint efforts of the countries in the region. 
Bulgaria also sufficiently contributes to the implementation of the Stability Pact for 
South Eastern Europe, which in addition to providing funds for the revival of the region 
contributes to the security, transparency and confidence in it. Within the framework of this 
initiative the country chaired the SEE Coordination table.142  
Right now Bulgaria enjoys a political consensus like never before. The politicians as 
well as the population are becoming more and more aware that “democracy is the only 
game in town.”143 The country has working institutions, its economy is progressing, and its 
image with the international financial institutions has been improved.  
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Bulgaria nowadays is peaceful and politically stable. Hopefully things will continue in 
the same mode and direction after the forthcoming elections in June 2001 because this is the 
right path. The story of Bulgaria, which those days more and more takes its role and place in 
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